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Abstract
The focus of this paper is the connection between conflict and commercial
activity. In particular, it focuses on the ongoing conflict in the Eastern
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that is funded, in large part, by the
sale of conflict commodities - minerals, metals, and petroleum - that fund
violent groups at their source and then enter legitimate markets and products
around the world. Recently, attention has turned to how to regulate conflict
commerce as a tool for divesting from violent conflict. In the United States,
for example, the recently adopted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act include a provision addressing conflict minerals
originating from this region. The violent and secretive nature of conflict
minerals transactions makes crafting effective regulation and policing
strategies challenging. As a result the Dodd-Frank Act, like other domestic
and international efforts, is designed in large part to discover, gather and
disseminate information about the nature and scale of conflict commodities
emanating from the DRC. This paper analyzes this legislation while also
discussing a number of other current conflict commerce governance efforts.
It observes the difficulty of regulating in the context of conflict and
corruption and analyses the use of regulation as a tool for information-
extraction, information-forcing and information-dissemination as opposed to
its use as a tool for directly proscribing undesirable behavior.
A. Introduction
Modem, large-scale violent conflict is costly. It is costly to human
dignity, security and well-being, of course. It is also expensive for the
parties to the conflict. Military spending is among the largest budget items
of many states. States raise the funds necessary for these expenditures
through a number of palatable and less palatable mechanisms, from taxation
to rent seeking and corruption. Large scale, non-state violence is also
expensive. For non-state warring parties, however, recourse to funds is a
more significant challenge. During Angola's decades-long civil war, the
government was able to fund its war effort largely through oil revenues
1
while the most powerful rebel group funded its efforts primarily through the
Angola spent at least 14.4 percent of its annual GDP on defense and security from
1997-2000. T. Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State (2004), 160.
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capture, control and sale of diamonds.2 The main rebel group in Colombia is
the world's largest cocaine manufacturer and finances a large portion of its
military actions through the sale of cocaine and cocaine paste.3 Rebel
groups in the Niger Delta sell oil produced at illegal oil refineries 4 as a
means to fund their activities. Other conflicts in a number of locations
including Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Cambodia and Afghanistan
have similarly been funded by the sale of timber, diamonds, and minerals.
The Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has been the site of an
ongoing conflict since May 1997. The conflict, despite its shifting contours
and intermittent lulls in violence, has resulted in the deaths of over 5 million
people over the past thirteen years, 5 marking it as one of the deadliest
conflicts since World War 11.6 The location is rich in natural resources -
including cobalt, copper, niobium, tantalum, petroleum, industrial
diamonds, gold, silver, zinc, manganese, tin, and uranium7 _ and the illegal
or "informal" sale of these raw materials is the primary source of funding
for this protracted conflict.
An important aspect of this fact is that these particular materials do
not have much intrinsic utility. Unlike potatoes or fish, the average person
cannot actually use them until they are processed and transformed into
useful goods or components. This means that rebel groups depend on a
series of partners along a stream of commerce to move these raw natural
2 Hodges, supra note 1, 176.
3 Federal Bureau of Investigation New York, 'Two Top Associates of Colombian
Narco-Terrorist Organization Found Guilty of Conspiring to Import Tons of Cocaine
into the United States' (10 April 2010) available at
http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrelI0/nyfo041410a.htm (last visited 10 April
2011), summarizing the FARC' s involvement in the cocaine trade.
4 C. Purefoy, 'Death and Oil in Niger Delta's Illegal Refineries' (3 August 2010)
available at http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-03/world/nigeria.oil.niger.delta 1
heating-oil-oil-industry-crude?_s=PM:WORLD (last visited 10 April 2011); S. Owen,
'Nigeria Destroys 600 Illegal Oil Refineries' (15 December 2009) available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/15/nigeria-oil-thieves-idUSLDE5BE28K
20091215 (last visited 10 April 2011).
5 CIA, 'The World Factbook - The Democratic Republic of Congo' available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html (last visited
10 April 2011).
6 S. Brownback & R. Durban, 'Hope for Africa's Forgotten: Fact-Finding Mission
Report: DRC, Rwanda, Kenya' (2005) (on file with the authors).
7 CIA, supra note 5.
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resources from their point of origin to a legitimate recipient who can process
them, transform them into component parts for consumer goods and thereby
derive value from them. Like in other conflict commerce situations, a large
portion of the initial trade in these minerals occurs illegally or through the
informal sector. 8 But unlike cocaine or other illegal goods, these minerals
are ultimately used in legal consumer products, including the electronic
equipment that occupies a central role in modem western life. As a result,
the early points along the trade route for these goods are difficult to fully
discern or comprehend, 9 while points closer to their end-use, once the taint
of conflict has been laundered from them, are much more transparent or
potentially transparent.
The link between conflict and minerals in the DRC has become the
subject of a number of governance efforts including studies, discussions,
and reports by non-governmental and international organizations,
complaints before the OECD National Contact Points bodies, and, recently,
litigation in the UK and legislation in the United States. This paper views
these efforts as interrelated, given the intricate web of the global supply
chain. It will focus, however, on recent U.S. legislation aimed at addressing
conflict minerals emanating from the DRC. The first part will describe this
legislation and dissect its underlying theories and goals. The second part
will discuss the deficits of the legislation and some of the challenges it is
likely to face, while the third part will highlight the legislation's potential to
have a beneficial direct impact on the problem of DRC-based conflict
commerce. Finally, the conclusion will provide suggestions for additional
measures that might be taken to supplement this legislation.
8 A. Tegera & D. Johnson, 'Rules For Sale: Formal and informal cross-border trade in
Eastern DRC' (May 2007) available at http://www.pole-institute.org/documents/
regardl9_anglais.pdf (last visited 10 April 2011), 5.
Resolve, 'Tracing a Path Forward: A Study of the Challenges of the Supply Chain for
Target Metals Used in Electronics' (April 2010) available at http://www.eicc.info/
documents/RESOLVEReport4.10.10.pdf (last visited 10 April 2011), 2-3.
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B. Section 1502: Conflict Minerals Legislation
I. Description of the Legislation
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank Act) represents the United States legislative response to the
collapse of the world financial market in the fall of 2008 and the credit crisis
that has pervaded the banking industry since that time. It is primarily
designed to better identify large-scale risk in the financial markets by
significantly increasing government oversight and regulation of banks,
private financial companies, and public markets, and by dramatically
increasing securities regulation. It also mandates the creation of a team of
federal regulators who will be charged with detecting systemic financial risk
and protecting consumers from dubious financial products.
The ongoing war in the DRC is seemingly disconnected from the
recent financial collapse and even more distant from the Dodd-Frank Act.
But this act, in addition to attempting to tackle massive financial problems,
also contains sections attempting to grapple with very complex social and
legal problems like the relationship between the minerals emerging from the
DRC and the seemingly interminable conflict in that region.
10
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act was inserted by Senators Sam
Brownback and Russ Feingold for the purpose of restricting the funding
sources available to armed groups in the DRC. Section 1502 has essentially
three parts. The first is addressed at companies that use conflict minerals in
manufacturing their products, while the second is addressed primarily at the
United States Secretary of State. The third part imposes reporting
requirements on the United States Comptroller and the Secretary of
Commerce.
10 111 th Congress of the USA, 'Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act' available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-11lhr4l73enr/
pdf/BILLS- 1I lhr4l73enr.pdf (last visited 21 April 2011), Section 1502.
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1. SEC Disclosures"
Companies covered by section 1502 will have to annually disclose to
the SEC and make available on their websites 12 the following information:
a) Whether conflict minerals that are "necessary to the
functionality or production of a product"'13 which they manufacture
originated in the DRC or any country with which it "shares an
internationally recognized border" (Angola, Burundi, Central African
Republic, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and
Zambia). 1
4
b) "[A] description of the measures taken [...] to exercise due
diligence on the source and chain of custody" of conflict minerals,
including a private audit of such disclosures (that must also be
submitted to the SEC), naming the auditor 15 and, in addition, "a
description of the products manufactured or contracted to be
manufactured that are not DRC conflict free, 16 [...] the facilities used
to process the conflict minerals, the country of origin of the conflict
minerals, and the efforts to locate the mine or location of origin with
the greatest possible specificity"17.
These disclosure requirements will remain in place until the President
of the United States certifies that "no armed groups continue to be directly
or indirectly involved and benefitting from commercial activity involving
1 At the time of this writing, the SEC has tentatively approved a structure for due
diligence and reporting requirements for three classes of companies, depending on
their listing-status and their known use of conflict minerals. See Federal Register,
Securities and Exchange Commission (23 December 2010) available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/34-63547fr.pdf (last visited 21 April 2011)
and E. Backes, 'SEC Recommends Rules on Conflict Minerals Regulation' (17
December 2010) available at http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/sec-recommends-
rules-conflict-minerals-regulation (last visited 21 April 2011).
12 Supra note 10, Section 1502(b) (p)(1)(E).
13 Supra note 10, Section 1502(2)(B).
14 Supra note 10, Section 1502(e)(1).
15 Supra note 10, Section 1502 (b) (p)(1)(A)(i) and 1502 (b) (p)(1)(A)(ii).
16 "DRC conflict free" is defined in the Dodd-Frank Act as not containing minerals "that
directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in the Democratic Republic of
Congo or an adjoining country", supra note 10, Section 1502(b) (p)(1)(D).
17 Supra note 10, Section 1502 (b) (p)(1)(A)(ii).
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conflict minerals". 18 However, no such certification can be made until at
least five years of the required reporting have passed.
2. Department of State Strategy and Map
The State Department is charged with developing a strategy and a map
addressing DRC conflict minerals - the Conflict Minerals Map. The strategy
must "address the linkages between human rights abuses, armed groups,
mining of conflict minerals and commercial products" 19. This strategy must
include three components, each aimed at different constituencies. It must
include:
a) a plan to assist the relevant agencies of the DRC, its
neighboring countries, and the international community (specifically
naming the United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic
Republic of Congo) to reduce the connection between minerals,
commerce, and conflict by developing stronger institutions for the
purposes of promoting transparency, monitoring, and ending conflict
commerce in the region;
20
b) a plan addressed to commercial entities looking to perform
due diligence on the points of origin and chain of custody for minerals
emanating from the DRC that are used in their products (or the
products of their suppliers) in order to ensure that such minerals are
DRC conflict free; 21 and
c) a description of punitive measures that could be taken against
parties whose activities support conflict in the DRC.22
The Conflict Minerals Map will call on data provided by the U.N.
Group of Experts on the DRC as well as data received from the
governments of the DRC, its adjoining countries, other U.N. member states,
and local and international NGOs, disclosing all sources on which the State
Department relied. It will produce and regularly update a publically
18 Supra note 10, Section 1502(b) (p)(4).
19 Supra note 10, Section 1502(c)(1)(A).
20 Supra note 10, Section 1502(c)(1)(B)(i).
21 Supra note 10, Section 1502(c)(1)(B)(ii).
22 Supra note 10, Section 1502(c)(1)(B)(iii) (emphasis added).
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available map of "mineral-rich zones, trade routes, and areas under the
control of armed groups" in the region.23
3. Required Reports Addressing Conflict Minerals
Section 1502 also contains a number of charges to the U.S.
Comptroller and Secretary of Commerce regarding baseline and ongoing
reporting. These reports have the potential of containing important
information. In addition to assessing the effectiveness of the SEC reporting
requirements and the challenges faced by the SEC in obtaining the reports
required by the Dodd-Frank Act, the Comptroller's reports are to contain the
following: a review of entities not required to file annual reports with the
SEC, the use of conflict minerals by non-filing companies, and whether
such conflict minerals originate from the DRC and its adjoining countries.24
The Department of Commerce must report on the quality of the required
private sector audits required and provide recommendations for improving
those audits. It must also provide a list of "all known conflict mineral
processing facilities worldwide"25.
II. Objectives Reflected in the Legislation
The new regulations do both less and more than one might expect,
given their purpose of restricting the sources of funding available to armed
groups in the DRC. The new regulations do not directly prohibit or restrict
imports of minerals originating in the DRC. Rather, Section 1502 is
designed primarily to extract, gather and disseminate information about the
connection between commercial activity and the conflict in the DRC and the
sources, flow, and chain of custody between the points of origin for conflict
minerals 26 and securities issuers that file mandatory reports with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.27 In doing so, the new regulations
23 Supra note 10, Section 1502(c)(2).
24 Supra note 10, Section 1502(d).
25 Supra note 10, Section 1502(d).
26 "Conflict minerals" means "(A) columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, gold,
wolframite or their derivatives; or (B) any other mineral or its derivatives determined
by the Secretary of State to be financing the conflict in the Democratic Republic of
Congo or an adjoining country", supra note 10, Section 1502(e)(4).
27 The Dodd-Frank Act actually fails to define what type of company is covered by
Section 1502 due to a drafting error in which two paragraphs in which the definition
of who is covered cross reference each other, while each failing to provide a
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will become part of on-going international governance efforts aimed at
stemming the connection between commerce and conflict in the DRC and
other locations around the world. This section of the paper will discuss the
designed objectives of the legislation, addressing its information-
management characteristics and the portions of Section 1502 that provide
key links with more proscriptive-model governance efforts addressing the
conflict in the DRC.
1. Extracting, Forcing and Devolving Information
This legislation is an outgrowth of other governance and regulatory
efforts that attempt to connect market activity with social problems,
especially in the areas of human rights,28 environmental protection2 9 and
corruption minimization.30 Like many of those efforts, Section 1502
operates not to proscribe undesirable activity (here, conflict commerce), but
rather to significantly affect the flow and location of information with
respect to this problem.
a) Underlying Theoretical Foundation
The fundamental theoretical premise of Section 1502 appears to be
that information is power and that vital information does not always reside
with the state. 31 This is the theoretical framework for what have been
referred to as "information-forcing" rules.32 Environmental law scholars
have discussed the information asymmetries that vex environmental
definition. (§§1502(b)(p)(1)(A) and 1502(b)(p)(2)(A)). However, a reasonable
interpretation is that it will apply to companies that are required to file mandatory
reports under §13(a)(2) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. This Article will
hereinafter refer to these entities as "companies."
28 E.g., the Kimberly Process and the work United Nations Special Representative on the
issue of Business and Human Rights.
29 E.g., SEC Regulation S-K, Item 103, Instruction 5.
30 E.g., the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.
31 F. Foucault, The History of Sexuality (1978), 79; F. Foucault, Power and Knowledge
(1980) and P. Bourdiue, Language and Symbolic Power (1991).
32 Most information-forcing literature has arisen in the context of private transactions,
with a fundamental observation being that the law often encourages parties with deep
legal knowledge to provide legal information to their less sophisticated contracting
counter-parties. See A. Schwartz & L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis (1979) and J. H. Verkerke,
'Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules' (2003) available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=405560 (last visited 21 April 2011).
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regulation of industrial waste, noting that manufacturing firms "almost
always know much more than government about the risks associated with
their products, technologies and processes" 33. Environmental regulatory
approaches, which, unlike human rights efforts, have always had a
commercial context in mind, have included, for example, the mandatory
reporting requirements of the National Environmental Protection Act
(NEPA)34 and mandatory reporting of even non-material environmental
litigation.35 Environmental law scholars have thus noted a turn away from
proscriptive legislation and toward information-forcing approaches that
focus on transparency and the devolution of information to interested
parties, including citizens, regulators, and NGOs. 36 Essentially, the idea is to
move information from the entity best situated to hold or obtain information
(the corporation) to the entity most likely to use it for the protection of
public interests (civil society and regulators).
Information-forcing has more recently become central to the issue of
business and human rights, as the United Nations Special Representative on
the Issue of Business and Human Rights has made due diligence for
businesses, with respect to their impact on human rights, a core component
of the Guiding Principles that have emerged from his efforts. 37 In addition,
as part of ongoing United Nations efforts with respect to conflict commerce,
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has
33 R. Zeckhauser & E.Parson, 'Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and
Regulatory Policymaking', 89 Minnesota Law Review (2004) 2, 277, 286-87.
34 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370, 1 January 1970.
35 Regulation S-K, Item 103, Instruction 5.
36 B. Karkkainen, 'Information As Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?', 89 Georgetown Law Journal (2001)
2, 257 and B. Karkkainen, 'Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits
in Environmental Regulation', 86 Texas Law Review (2008) 7, 1409 (noting that while
information deficits pervade environmental regulatory problems, the massive amount
of information agencies do receive from environmental reporting can often be
debilitating).
37 See e.g. J. Ruggie, ,Engaging Business: Addressing Respect for Human Rights' (25
February 2010) available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/newsand
stories/Ruggie Atlanta.pdf (last visited 10 April 2011). See also C. Ochoa, ,The 2008
Ruggie Report: A Framework for Business and Human Rights', 12 ASIL Insights
(18 June 2008) available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf dev/AbsByAuth.
cfin?per id=439960 (last visited 10 April 2011).
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very recently launched a pilot project on due diligence, specifically
addressing the mining sector.38
b) Information Asymmetries and SEC Reporting
Similar information flow challenges exist in the conflict commerce
context, and information-forcing is thus crucial. Arguably, however, in the
area of conflict commerce, even manufacturers and other businesses covered
by Section 1502 may lack crucial information about the source of the
minerals that go into their products and whether the minerals they use
facilitate conflict. In this way, the company disclosure portion of Section
1502 represents a regulatory experiment in information extraction because it
addresses companies in a context in which they are not the entity best
situated to hold or obtain the relevant information. It is therefore designed to
force information not just from covered companies, but also to extract
information from their supply chain, all the way to the mine of origin -
finding the conflict. The aim is to allow the U.S. Comptroller, the Secretary
of State and other interested parties to either - ideally - identify the mines
of origin and chain of custody for conflict minerals or - alternatively -
determine the points along the chain of custody at which information flows
break or transparency stops.
This design seems to embed a number of objectives. First, it is
designed to improve the amount and accuracy of information. In other
words, it is designed to improve actual knowledge of conflict commerce
and, in this way, Section 1502 is innovative. Second, it is designed to
increase transparency and to force information about conflict commodities
from commercial actors. Third, it is designed to improve the accessibility of
information about conflict minerals and conflict commerce by making
companies' mandatory reports publically available, on their websites, for
example. Presumably, interested parties will use this information to, for
example, place pressure at the points along the supply chain where
information stops flowing, wherever that may be.
38 OECD, 'Pilot Project on Due Diligence in the Mining and Minerals Sector' (May
2010) available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/49/44322951 .pdf (last visited 21
April 2011).
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c) Producing and Gathering Official Information
The portions of Section 1502 imposing duties on the Secretary of
State and USAID serve similar information-extracting, -forcing and -
devolution purposes. Section 1502 asks the Secretary of State, together with
USAID, to use essentially whatever information is at their disposal to
collect data for the Conflict Minerals Map. Their data collection must
involve the U.N. Group of Experts on the DRC as well as the governments
of the DRC and adjoining countries and from local and international non-
governmental organizations. This extensive information gathering effort is
likely to be more than an information-forcing exercise in which relevant
actors, including NGOs, provide pre-existing information. A recent job
posting by USAID for an Extractive Industries Technical Advisor for the
DRC would suggest that additional and different information than is
currently known or verified is being sought with respect to conflict
commerce in the region.
39
The remainder of Section 1502 requiring to the Secretary of State to
develop a strategy on the DRC conflict minerals issue looks much more like
a traditional mandate to develop law-like governance efforts. These efforts
must be made in consultation with governments and the U.N. Group of
Experts on the DRC, including a description of the punitive measures that
could be used against actors engaged in conflict commerce in the region.
40
d) Information Processing, Analysis and Dissemination
The drafters of Section 1502 appear to have been cognizant of the
possibility that its SEC reporting aspects will face challenges. The reports
the Comptroller General is tasked with preparing must include not only
assimilated and processed statistics of the reports the SEC receives but also
an assessments of whether Section 1502 appears to have contributed to the
region's stability, devoting special attention to sexual and gender-based
violence. In addition to these two requirements, the reports must also
include information about the larger conflict commerce problem, including
presumably all non-reporting actors and all conflict mineral processing
39 USAID solicitation number SOL-660-10-000009, 19 July 2010. (on file with the
authors).
40 Supra note 10, Section 1502(c)(1)(B)(i).
GoJIL 3 (2011) 1,129-154
plants around the world.4 1 These reports, if prepared well, could be
beneficial in raising general awareness of the conflict commerce problem.
The Secretary of Commerce is also charged with filing reports that
could have real benefits outside of its discrete mandate. In analyzing the
reports of the private audits that must accompany the SEC reports, the
Secretary of Commerce is asked to essentially professionalize this type of
private sector auditing through two measures. The first is to serve as a
performance check on the accuracy of private sector audits and other due
diligence measures carried out under Section 1502. The second seems to
assume that the auditing process will be flawed and asks the Secretary of
Commerce to recommend methods to improve the audits and to set best
practice standards for the industry.42 Attention to the current quality and
practices of social-issue auditing has the potential to have affects not just in
the area of conflict commerce but also in other related fields, including
corruption reduction measures like those required by the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative,43 labor standards compliance and human
rights monitoring.
2. Connecting to Existing and Developing Governance Efforts
Another aspect of Section 1502 is notable for its potential to have
beneficial impacts on the DRC conflict commerce problem. As previously
noted, the Secretary of State's reports are to include a strategy that will
include "[a] description of punitive measures that could be taken against
individuals or entities whose commercial activities are supporting armed
groups and human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo." 44 This provision will likely be interpreted to mean that the
Secretary must prepare an analysis of already-existing measures, but it could
also be interpreted as a mandate for the State Department to propose
punitive measures. Among the measures that should be included is the
41 Supra note 10, Section 1502(d).
42 Supra note 10, Section 1502(d).
43 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is a global effort aimed at stemming
corruption in the extractive sector by requiring companies and governments to report
on payments made and received in connection with extractive activities. Section 1504
of the Dodd-Frank Act enacts many of the requirements of the EITI and has the
potential to bring the United States and United States companies closer to EITI
compliance.
44 Supra note 10, Section 1502(c)(B)(iii).
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possibility that entities reporting trade in conflict minerals will be subject to
targeted sanctions in accordance with two United Nations Security Council
Resolutions.
The Section 1502 SEC reporting requirements put the United States in
technical compliance with the requirements of UNSC Resolution 1857,
under which U.N. member states are requested to ensure that relevant
parties are performing due diligence with respect to DRC conflict related
natural resources. 45 However, UNSC Resolutions 185746 and 189647 also
call for targeted sanctions in the form of asset bans and travel freezes
against "[i]ndividuals or entities supporting the illegal armed groups in the
eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo through illicit trade of
natural resources" 48 and encourages member states to submit a list of
entities that fit this description.49
Arguably, the language in the UNSC Resolutions encouraging
member-states to report on relevant entities does not create binding
obligations for member-states. However, litigation in the United Kingdom
recently addressed claims that the U.K. has acted unlawfully in failing to
submit names of British entities trading in conflict minerals in accordance
with the terms of UNSC Resolutions 1857 and 1896.50. Although the UK
High Court has decided not to review the UK government's decision not to
list such companies, the United States Government should be watching this
litigation carefully, as it may be a model for claims against the United States
if it fails to submit the names of entities who report reliance on conflict
minerals in their SEC reports.
45 SC Res. 1857, 22 December 2008, para.15.
46 SC Res. 1857, paras 4(g), 16-19.
47 SC Res. 1896, 30 November 2009, paras 19-20.
48 SC Res. 1857, para.15.
49 SC Res. 1857, para.16.
50 Global Witness, 'Global Witness takes UK government to court for failing to list UK
companies trading Congo conflict minerals for UN sanctions' (26 July 2010) available
at http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-witness-takes-uk-government-court-
failing-list-uk-companies-trading-congo-conflict (last visited 21 April 2011). The UK
High Court has denied review of the UK government's decision to not list these
companies.
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C. Deficits and Challenges
Up to this point in this Article, we have described Section 1502 of the
Dodd-Frank Act and provided an analysis of its grounding and purposes.
This section will proceed by pointing to the failings and challenges we see
in the legislation. They fall into three categories. First, we will critique the
information-extraction and information-forcing portions of Section 1502.
Second, we will critique the information-dissemination portions of Section
1502. Finally, we will discuss the potential negative consequences of the
legislation.
I. Section 1502 Information-Forcing and Information-
Extracting Assumptions
The information-extraction and information-forcing portions of
Section 1502, both in the context of the required SEC reports and with
respect to the Map on Conflict Minerals seem to assume that current
information levels regarding DRC conflict minerals are low. The general
parameters of the DRC conflict commerce problem are understood by the
U.S. Congress at this point51 and are even reported in the popular press.52 A
number of international organizations and local and international NGOs that
focus on discovering specific and detailed information regarding conflict
commodities, specifically conflict commodities emerging from the DRC,
51 S. Brownback & R. Durbin, Hope for Africa's Forgotten, A Report on the Fact-
Finding Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Kenya (2005).
See also Resolve, 'Tracing a Path Forward: A Study of the Challenges of the Supply
Chain for Target Metals Used in Electronics' (April 2010) available at
http://www.eicc.info/documents/RESOLVEReport4.10.10.pdf (last visited 21 April
2011), 6-7.
52 See e.g., B. Harden, 'The Dirt in the New Machine' (12 August 2001) available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/12/magazine/the-dirt-in-the-new-machine.html (last
visited 21 April 2011) and 'Bringing Congo's Great War to an End' (1 August 2002)
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/01/opinion/bringing-congo-s-great-war-
to-an-end.html (last visited 21 April 2011) and D. Gilson, 'What's Really Inside Your
iPhone?' (31 March 2010) available at http://motherjones.com/blue-marble/2010/
03/whats-inside-your-apple-iphone-ipad (last visited 21 April 2011) or D. Gilson,
'The Scary Truth About Your iPhone' available at http://motherjones.com/
environment/2010/03/scary-truth-about-your-iphone (last visited 21 April 2011) or A.
Hochschild, 'Blood and Treasure' (March/April 2010) available at http://motherjones.
com/politics/2010/02/congo-gold-adam-hochschild (last visited 21 April 2011).
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regularly produce very valuable information and recommendations. 53 In
order to make the five-year window for this legislation as effective as
possible, such that the work of the relevant agencies results in new
knowledge and a better understanding of the conflict minerals problem,
rather than simply placing an official imprimatur on pre-existing
knowledge, the Secretary of State, together with USAID, the Comptroller
General and the Secretary of Commerce must make full use of the pre-
existing information.
This is necessary because the biggest challenge with respect to curing
information asymmetries in this context is not forcing information from
legitimate actors - though that alone may be a significant challenge. Rather,
53 For example, a number of organizations, including U.S. law school human rights
clinics have been engaged in the mapping required from the State Department. See
e.g., Columbia Law School, 'Human Rights Clinid Docket' available at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/centerprogram/human rights/Docket#165357 (last
visited 21 April 2011) and The New Security Beat, 'DRC's Conflict Minerals: Can
U.S. Law Impact the Violence?' (13 July 2010) available at http://newsecuritybeat.
blogspot.com/2010/07/drcs-conflict-minerals-can-us-law.html (last visited 21 April
2011). DRC-based organizations have been studying the issues of conflict minerals
and have provided very useful information regarding the chain of custody for many
minerals in the region. See e.g. Tegera & Johnson, supra note 8 and Pole Institute,
'Blood Minerals: The Criminalization of the Mining Industry in Eastern DRC'
(August 2010) available at http://www.pole-institute.org/documents/Blood_
Minerals.pdf (last visited 21 April 2011). A number of international NGOs have also
devoted significant attention to the issue of DRC conflict minerals. See e.g., a
description of Global Witness' campaigns on Natural Resources in Conflict and on the
DRC (described here: Global Witness, 'Conflict' available at
http://www.globalwitness.org/pages/en/natural resources in conflict.html (last
visited 21 April 2011) and here Global Witness, 'Democratic Republic of Congo'
available at
http://www.globalwitness.org/pages/en/democratic republic of congo.html (last
visited 21 April 2011), respectively). Finally, the UNSC and the Group of Experts on
the Democratic Republic of Congo have been focused on this issue for many years.
See e.g. K. A. Annan, 'Letter dated 12 April 2001 from the Secretary-General to the
President of the Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo' (12 April 2001) available at http://www.un.org/
News/dh/latest/drcongo.htm (last visited 21 April 2011) and M. L. R. Viotti, Letter
dated 21 May 2010 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo
addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2010/252, 25 May
2010.
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given the current level of knowledge, the difficulty and the place of much
greater importance lies deeper in the chain of custody, much closer to the
mines and the conflict. Information regarding these locations will be crucial
in actually linking commercial activity to conflict. Reports from the most
relevant regions of the DRC, including very recent reports, indicate that the
area is beyond the reach of the DRC government and is, instead, under the
control of military and police battalions that operate in a highly occlusive,
illegal and corrupt environment.54 Similarly, recent efforts to develop a code
of conduct on supply chain management for minerals used in electronics
discuss the "difficulty verifying sources that enter the supply chain from
"55mines that are illegal or part of the informal economy"
Obviously, the more accurate, specific, and complete companies are
able to be in their SEC reports on conflict minerals, the more useful those
reports will be in effectively stopping the use of minerals to fund the DRC
conflict. However, when companies discover that minerals on which they
depend contribute to the conflict in the DRC, they will face significant
disincentives to fully comply with their reporting requirements, given the
potential legal and economic consequences of their activities,56 including
potential litigation under the Alien Tort Statute,57 complaints before
54 See e.g., P. P. Rudahigwa, 'Seventy-Two Hours at the Mining Site of Bisie', in Pole
Institute, 'Blood Minerals: The Criminalization of the Mining Industry in Eastern
DRC' (August 2010) available at http://www.pole-institute.org/documents/Blood_
Minerals.pdf (last visited 21 April 2011), 12.
55 Resolve, supra note 9, 3. The Resolve report is not exclusively focused on the DRC
and notes the challenges of illegality and corruption generally. For example, it cites
the following report: FinnWatch, 'Legal and Illegal Blurred: Update on tin production
for consumer electronics in Indonesia' (June 2009) available at
http://makeitfair.org/the-facts/reports (last visited 21 April 2011) (published as part of
the makeITfair campaign, a European wide project on consumer electronics).
56 C.Ochoa, 'Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Compliance: Lessons from the
International Law - International Relations Discourse', Santa Clara Journal of
International Law (2011, forthcoming) (discussing compliance theory as applied to
businesses in the CSR context).
57 28 USC § 1350. At the time this Article was drafted, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 17 September
2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/091710
atsruling.pdf (last visited 21 April 2011) had recently been decided. In that case the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decidedly held that corporations
are not subject to liability under the Alien Tort Statute. See also John Doe I v. Nestle,
CV 05-5133 SVW, United States District Court - Central District of California,. 8
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National Contact Point bodies, targeted sanctions under the UNSC
Resolutions discussed above, and consumer boycotts.
II. Section 1502 Information-Devolution Assumptions
As discussed above, Section 1502 is designed not just to extract and
accumulate information but also to increase access to DRC conflict mineral
information through requirements that companies post required information
on their websites and through the various mandated reports. Below, in the
section we have reserved for an optimistic analysis of legislation, we will
discuss the benefits this may have for future legislative and international
organization efforts and NGO-sponsored campaigns and litigation. Here,
however, we merely note that one of the assumptions of this legislation is
that consumers will actually care enough about this issue that they will use
their purchasing power to dissuade companies from using conflict minerals
in electronic equipment. The legislation stands to be extremely effective if
consumers are educated about conflict minerals and, on a scale large enough
to matter, make decisions to purchase products that can be certified as
"conflict free". The Kimberly Process, which is an effort to end the
connection between diamonds and conflict, has been successful largely for
this reason. It remains to be seen, however, whether consumers will act
similarly in the context of electronic equipment and conflict minerals.
III. Potential Negative Consequences of Section 1502
Although the legislation has been lauded as a real victory and step
forward in terminating the link between conflict and minerals in the DRC,58
there is real concern that the legislation could have devastating economic
consequences in the Eastern region of the DRC. Despite oppressive
corruption and abysmal standards of living for miners in the region, the
miners still depend on the continued viability of local mines as their only
source of work and income. It is possible that Section 1502 will, over time,
improve conditions in the Eastern DRC. This could happen if minerals from
the region retain their value, but only when "conflict free". A legitimate
September 2010 holding that the existing authorities fail to show that corporate
liability is sufficiently well-defined to sustain an ATS claim.
58 See e.g., Global Witness, 'U.S. passes landmark reform on resource transparency' (15
July 2010) available at http://www.globalwitness.org/media librarydetail.php/
1028/en/u.s._passeslandmark reforms on resource transparency (last visited 21
Aoril 2011).
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concern coming from the region, however, is that the SEC reporting
requirements of 1502 will act as a strong deterrent for reporting companies,
and they will effectively divest from the region, rendering minerals in the
region valueless, leaving a mining-dependent economy in ruins. Locally-
based NGOs have warned that this may lead to even more conflict. 59 This
concern is elevated by frustrations expressed by local communities that they




In this section we will conclude by analyzing those portions of the bill
that support reasonable optimism regarding Section 1502's efficacy. The
reporting requirements and performance measures of the portion addressing
information-extracting and information-forcing are designed well enough to
effectively address some aspects of conflict commerce problem, and may
induce firms to adopt a normative stance against the use of conflict
minerals. The information dissemination portion opens up the possibility of
market behavior shifts resulting from effective consumer awareness, more
effective sanctions as well as the use of information in future litigation in
coordination with other efforts (e.g., Red Flags, German Federal Bureau of
Geo-Sciences and Natural Resources initiative to render Easter DRC
minerals conflict-free, the English Tin Supply Chain Initiative, the World
Bank's Department for International Development/Congolese Ministry of
Mines work on cassiterite etc.).
59 D. Johnson, 'Killing the Economy in the Name of Peace?' (19 July 2010) available at
http://www.pole-institute.org/site%20web/echos/echo138.htm (last visited 21 April
2011). On March 1, 2011 a group of local NGOs from the DRC filed a submission
with the SEC expressing these concerns. See M. Choyt, Democratic Republic of
Congo: Mining Cooperatives speak out critically about Dodd-Frank Act' (1 March
2011) available at http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=25062 (last visited 21
April 2011) and ITRI, 'DR Congo miners request direct talks with US government on
trade embargo' (4 March 2011) available at http://www.itri.co.uk/pooled/articles/
BF NEWSART/view.asp?Q=BF NEWSART_322533 (last visited 21 April 2011).
60 Johnson, supra note 59.
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I. Compliance with and Effectiveness of Section 1502
Despite a well-developed body of literature that observes high levels
of state compliance with international law and theorizes as to the reasons for
otherwise sovereign entities to submit to a legal system that curtails their
freedom of action, very little attention has been given to the question of why
firms comply with global governance initiatives. 61 While a direct analogy to
existing theories of compliance with international law and international
relations is imperfect, there are very useful insights that suggest reasons for
optimism about corporate compliance with Section 1502, as part of the
global governance efforts aimed at stemming conflict commerce.
In this particular context, one viable critique of Section 1502 could be
that corporations will not or will only marginally comply with the reporting
requirements, especially given the SEC's already-thin enforcement capacity.
Two observations are important here, however. The first is that a failure to
attain full compliance does not necessarily render governance ineffective. In
this case, if the legislation results in more or better information than we
currently have about the sources of DRC-linked minerals or about the
connection between minerals and conflict, the legislation will have been at
least somewhat effective. Second, a growing body of research demonstrates
that firms have significant incentives to comply with their obligations, and
actually do comply, even when not strongly monitored or consistently or
strongly sanctioned for deviance.
62
Management theory is helpful in explaining this phenomenon. It
argues that the inclusion of institutionalized performance measures strongly
promotes obedience, even when enforcement is lacking.63 These measures
typically include the regular collection of pertinent information,
performance reviews of various sorts, and opportunities to modify norms
61 Ochoa, supra note 56.
62 See G. Downs et al., 'Is the good news about compliance good news about
cooperation?', 50 International Organization (1996) 3, 379 (advancing a political
economy view of compliance and arguing that the strength of enforcement is central
to compliance).
63 D. G. Victor, K. Raustiala & E. B. Skolnikoff, 'Introduction and Overview' in
D. Victor, K. Raustiala & E. B. Skolnikoff (eds), The Implementation and
Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments (1998), 1-46.
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and institutions in light of increased or changing knowledge. 64 All of these
features can be found in the corporate reporting-related components of
Section 1502, including the obligations imposed on the Comptroller General
and the Secretary of Commerce. This may augur well for corporate
compliance with the act and, ultimately, for its effectiveness. All the more
so, given the surveillance role for civil society that is implied in the
information-devolution aspects of the legislation and the effectiveness-
analysis reports required from the Comptroller General.
In addition to the design of Section 1502, which lends itself to
optimism given the observations of managerial theory, the growing mass of
governance efforts with respect to conflict commerce and business activity
in conflict zones to which business actors have actively contributed opens
space for earnest reasons for optimism, given the observations of
constructivist and legal process compliance scholars.
Constructivist international relations scholars have built their theories
around the importance of rules and the power of shared knowledge and
dialogue in altering states' value systems, normative beliefs, and identities.
65
Similarly, international legal process scholars have argued that the discourse
and process of norm articulation is effective in moving states toward
compliance.66 Louis Henkin, like later constructivist compliance theorists,
asserted that the process of discursive engagement in the creation of
knowledge and the elaboration of norms and expectations is itself the thing
that brings states closer to compliance. It is this joint endeavor that has a
deep effect on the identity of the affected actors.67 Under this view, it is not
so much the strategic self-interest of a given regimes' creator that causes
compliance, but rather the shared ownership over knowledge and norms
arising from the discourse that births the regime. 68 This would certainly
suggest that firms may internalize the conflict commerce reducing norms
64 Id.
65 See e.g., R. Keohane, 'When Does International Law Come Home?', 35 Houston Law
Review (1998) 3, 699.
66 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave, 2nd ed. (1979).
67 F. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions on the Conditions of Practical and Legal
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (1989).
68 K. Raustiala & A.-M. Slaughter, 'International Law, International Relations and
Compliance', in T. Risse, W. Carlsneas & B. A. Simmons, Handbook of International
Relations (2005), 538, 540. This, together with factors such as reputation and
domestic politics, tilts states in the direction of compliance.
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they are participating in creating, despite the possibility of increased
sourcing costs as well as reputational, economic, and legal risks as
governance efforts start to eliminate the possibility of taking financial
advantage of a market made fragile by its entanglement with conflict.
II. Potential Uses of Information
There are a number of potential uses for information that is
accumulated and made publically available. Among these uses are the
potential for consumer awareness and boycotts, targeted sanctions from a
state or international organizations, the basis for legal or quasi-legal claims,
and coordination with or assimilation into other conflict commerce
governance efforts.
As mentioned previously, it is reasonable to question whether this
legislation will change consumer choices enough that reductions in sales
outweigh the economic gains that companies currently implicated in this
activity currently enjoy. However, consumer boycott studies have noted that
boycotts can be successful in attaining their objectives even when this is not
the case.69 In addition to this observation, literature on consumer boycotts
suggests that conflict commerce is the type of issue that could easily lead to
a successful boycott, either because it is effective at significantly altering
consumer behavior or because it affects the risk calculation of targeted
companies enough that they stop relying on conflict commodities.70 The
factors that contribute to a boycott's efficacy include the "awareness of
consumers; the values of potential consumer participants; the consistency of
boycott goals with participant attitudes; the cost of participation; social
pressure; and the credibility of the boycott leadership"71 . Many of these
factors are likely to fall in the direction of conflict commerce-based
boycotts. In addition, the psychological motivations of boycotters indicate
that such boycotts would be successful. These motivations include a desire
69 N. C. Smith, Morality and the Market: Consumer Pressure for Corporate
Accountability (1990).
70 See generally M. Freedman, Consumer Boycotts: Effecting Change through the
Market Place and the Media, (1999), 21-32.
71 J. Klein, A. John & N. C. Smith, 'Exploring Motivation in Consumer Boycott'
(November 2001) available at http://www.london.edu/facultyandresearch/research/
docs/01-701.pdf?pagewanted=all (last visited 21 April 2011), 4-5, citing D. E. Garrett,
'The Effectiveness of Marketing Policy Boycotts: Environmental Opposition to
Marketing' 51 Journal of Marketing (1987) 2, 46-57.
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among consumers to maintain consistent beliefs about the kind of person
they already believe themselves to be and to have "clean hands" with
respect to behavior or issues they judge as wrong.72 These two interrelated
motivations suggest some reasons for optimism on this issue, given the
strong normative case against contributing, actively or passively,
intentionally or unintentionally, to the type of violent conflict present in the
DRC.
In addition to consumer boycotts, the UNSC Resolutions mentioned
above authorize targeted sanctions against companies engaged in
commercial activity associated with the conflict in the DRC. Also, as
previously discussed, litigation recently initiated against the United
Kingdom arguing that the U.K. had acted unlawfully in failing to submit
names of British entities trading in conflict minerals in accordance with the
terms of UNSC Resolutions 1857 and 1896 provides evidence of civil-
society policing of UN member state compliance with the relevant
resolutions. 73 This may elevate the pressure on states and international
organizations to impose targeted sanctions that might include naming
specific corporate actors and conflict leaders, prohibiting business dealings
with named entities and imposing asset freezes and travel bans for named
entities. As the amount of information about particular companies'
involvement in conflict commerce is improved, targeted sanctions may
become a more popular and more useful tool for states to employ.
E. Conclusion
This conclusion will provide some recommendations that fall outside
the relatively narrow ambit of Section 1502 that we believe will optimize
the likelihood that this legislation - and future efforts on conflict commerce
in the DRC and elsewhere - will be effective.
First, we propose that, before financing a transaction in a conflict or
post-conflict area, a bank or other lender collect a conflict bond and that
finance and guarantee institutions such as the U.S. Overseas Private
Investment Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
consider requiring that such bonds be in place before they will provide
72 Klein, John & Smith, supra note 71, 6.
73 Global Witness, supra note 50.
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financing or insure against political risk. In most countries, corporations
operate with care for a host of reasons, among them the potential that they
will suffer a penalty if they violate a regulation. In conflict areas, this
important incentive is absent. Imposing a conflict bond would provide a
financial incentive to corporations and other investors to take a similar level
of care in conflict areas - where government oversight is virtually non-
existent - as they take in non-conflict areas. Such bonds would be forfeited
in the face of successful claims before international bodies like the OECD
National Contact Points,74 or domestic courts.75 If forfeited, such a bond
would be used to compensate the local community for any harm they suffer
as a result of the commercial activity.
Second, we propose vigilant attention to engagement with and
empowerment of local communities and civil society so that they can better
enforce local norms and preferences. We are concerned, in particular, that a
portion of the Congolese community appears dissatisfied by the amount of
participation they have had in the SEC rule drafting process.76 It is
imperative to the legitimacy of any future regulatory regime that local
communities and leaders have had (and believe they have had) a role in the
process by which it was formed and that it is structured around the realities
they live. We propose two specific tactics to give effect to this strategy.
First, we propose that any local Congolese organization asking for an
opportunity to inform the SEC's rule formation process be granted a
reasonable time and opportunity to make appropriate interventions. This is a
mandatory baseline. Second, we propose that the jurisdiction of the World
Bank Inspection Panel be expanded to include projects financed by any
international body. The Inspection Panel is an independent arm of the World
74 'Final Statement by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises: Afrimex (UK) Ltd' (28 August 2008) available at
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file47555.doc (last visited 21 April 2011).
75 In November 2010, a group of Congolese citizens filed a class action case against
Anvil Mining Ltd. in Montreal Canada alleging that "the company, by providing
logistical assistance, played a role in human rights abuses, including the massacre by
the Congolese military of more than 70 people in the Democratic Republic of Congo
in 2004". See Global Witness, 'Congolese victims file class action against Canadian
mining company' (8 November 2010) available at http://www.globalwitness.org/
library/congolese-victims-file-class-action-against-canadian-mining-company (last
visited 21 April 2011).
76 Johnson, supra note 59.
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Bank created to give a forum to persons affected by Bank-funded projects.
As it is currently structured, the Inspection Panel reviews requests for
inspection from people adversely affected by Bank-funded projects to
ensure that the Bank has followed its own procedures. The Panel has the
authority to conduct an independent investigation of complaints and, if
necessary, order changes necessary to bring projects into compliance with
the Bank's procedures. We propose expanding the Inspection Panel's
jurisdiction to permit it to review complaints regarding projects or
investments funded by any part of the World Bank Group or other
international institution. This would include projects receiving support from
e.g. the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), any of the
regional development banks, or any import/export-credit agencies. Finally,
we propose expanding the jurisdiction of the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) to permit community groups to
intervene in or initiate claims against corporations for human rights
violations. The ICSID is an international institution created by treaty to
resolve investment disputes between member states and foreign investors.
As currently structured, the ICSID's jurisdiction does not permit members
of the local communities affected by investments to raise concerns about
those investments. Modifying the ICSID's jurisdiction would begin to put
local communities on the same legal footing as the corporations and
financial institutions whose projects affect them.
Section 1502 and the forthcoming SEC rules it requires are an
experiment in information management and the regulatory capacity of
information-extraction, information-forcing and information-devolution. For
the reasons we have stated herein, there is room for cautious optimism that
it will have some effect on the flow of information and also on the flow of
minerals that fund one of the worst on-going conflicts in recent history.
How this information is reported and used will ultimately affect other efforts
aimed at curbing the connection between minerals and conflict in the DRC.
The on-going strategies we describe herein, and also those we have
proposed will surely benefit from well drafted SEC rules emerging from
Section 1502.
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